Abstract This study focuses on the association of voluntary compensation disclosure and ownership structure. It provides evidence that the detachment of control and cash flow rights in dual class share firms is associated with lower levels of compensation disclosure. This association is incremental to the level of managerial ownership and family ownership. The study attributes these disclosure results to the concealment of excess compensation in dual class share firms. Consistent with this explanation, the study finds that managers in dual class share firms earn higher compensation relative to their single class counterparts. An analysis within dual class firms also reveals that compensation disclosure is decreasing in managers' voting control but increasing in their cash flow rights consistent with a private control benefits explanation. To examine these research questions, the study develops a contextual measure of compensation disclosure that attempts to capture firms' economic bases for award of compensation.
Introduction
This study examines the association of voluntary compensation disclosure and ownership structure by employing dual class share firms. Specifically, it addresses two research questions: (a) Does the mechanism of concentrating managerial ownership (i.e. by separating control rights from cash flow rights in dual class share firms) influence voluntary compensation disclosure? (b) How are control rights and cash flow incentives differentially associated with voluntary compensation disclosure?
Dual class equity structures provide a unique setting to explore an important dimension of ownership structure-the mechanism of concentrating management ownership. This is because dual class equity structures not only concentrate ownership but also achieve this concentrated ownership by separating control rights from cash flow rights (also referred to as control divergence). Such ownership structures allow managers to hold a high proportion of voting rights without a commensurate level of cash flow rights, thereby allowing managers to escape the wealth consequences of their own decisions.
1 Consequently the incentives to indulge in wealth diversionary behavior or extract private benefits are higher in dual class share firms compared to firms with a one-share-one-vote rule (DeAngelo and DeAngelo 1985; Grossman and Hart 1988) .
2 A simple type of private benefit is excess compensation (Zingales 1995) . Smart and Zutter (2003) provide both anecdotal and empirical evidence from the United States (US) to show that managers in dual class share firms extract higher compensation relative to their single class counterparts. Therefore, examining compensation disclosures in US dual class share firms may present an interesting experimental setting to test if managers adopt disclosure choices that conceal some of these private control benefits such as excess compensation.
Opacity in compensation disclosures can help mitigate the costs of reporting high compensation (e.g. the political costs or adverse capital market effects or more generally the ''outrage costs'') by making compensation amounts appear as less excessive or more favorable relative to firm performance (Watts and Zimmerman 1986; Murphy 1996) .
3 While outsiders can observe the level of compensation, they can only imperfectly assess whether it is excessive relative to peers or firm performance (Zingales 1995) . Strategic disclosure of compensation practices in such firms can influence the perception of excessive compensation and reduce these ''outrage costs'' by obfuscating the economic basis for awarding compensation such as peer group comparisons, criteria for performance compensation etc. This study therefore develops a new disclosure measure that captures information that a firm may voluntarily choose to disclose regarding its compensation policy.
The economic basis of a firm's compensation policy is commonly disclosed in the narrative portion of the compensation committee report of proxy statements. The SEC in 2004 argued that ''much disclosure we see in the compensation committee 1 For example, consider a dual class share firm that issues 100 Class A shares with ten votes each and 500 Class B shares with one vote each, both with equal rights to dividends. A controlling shareholder may hold 90 Class A shares and none of the Class B shares. His control rights are therefore 90*10/ (100*10 ? 500*1) = 60 % while his cash flow rights are only 90/(100 ? 500) i.e. 15 %. High control rights give him the power and influence to divert corporate resources to himself. However, because his equity incentives in the firm are only 15 %, it allows him to escape the consequences of his illegal diversion e.g. the adverse stock price effect on his 15 % equity ownership. 2 Bebchuk et al. (2000) also argue that the potential for agency conflict between controlling shareholders and outsiders in dual class share firms is higher than that in even single class concentrated ownership firms. 3 Although Watts and Zimmerman (1986) did not explicitly consider political costs of compensation, others have used their theories to explain executive compensation practices (e.g. Balsam and Ryan 1996). report is just boilerplate and is not very informative… companies and their advisers have not reciprocated with more transparent disclosure''. 4 The lack of informativeness and specificity in these disclosures is widespread even after the SEC overhauled the compensation disclosure regulations in 2006 and continues to this date (Hewitt Associates 2006) . Given this background, the measure of voluntary disclosure employed in this study captures the discretion that managers have in choosing to provide ''boilerplate'' or opaque disclosures with respect to the economic rationale for executive compensation. Investigating how this disclosure measure behaves in settings where the incentives to extract private benefits are high can give us deeper insights into the motive to conceal private rents as a primary determinant of corporate disclosure.
To investigate this issue, a sample of 210 US dual class firms and a size-andindustry matched sample of single class share firms were chosen for the years 2000 and 2001. This period witnessed misreporting by US public companies, governance scandals and excessive executive compensation packages on an unprecedented scale. It was thus an ideal and timely setting to not only examine the theoretical issues relating to governance, compensation and disclosure but also to acquire power for the empirical tests. I find that compensation disclosure transparency is lower for dual class share firms. The evidence is consistent with the explanation that when agency costs precipitated by control divergence in dual class share firms are high, such firms are likely to adopt disclosure choices that protect their private control benefits. This explanation is indeed supported by the higher compensation levels observed in dual class firms.
While studying reporting practices in dual class share firms can yield new insights, they can also help resolve some of the empirical challenges in prior literature. For instance, some prior studies have attempted to examine the disclosure consequences of corporate ownership structure (Makhija and Patton 2004 ). However, a major constraint in these studies is that the two separate effects of ownership-incentive alignment and entrenchment-are identified using only one variable-managerial ownership. An analysis within dual class firms offers a solution to this problem. Since these firms have equity structures that break the link between control and cash flow rights, the ownership structure of dual class firms allows one to separate the role of these two effects on disclosure. Thus the second research question-how are control and cash flow rights differentially associated with voluntary disclosure, attempts to isolate the entrenchment and incentive alignment effects of ownership as manifested in voluntary compensation disclosure.
Using a sample of only dual class share firms, this study documents that compensation disclosure is negatively associated with the level of managerial voting control and positively associated with the level of managerial cash flow rights. Higher cash flow rights ownership eliminates managerial incentives to extract rents such as those in the form of excess compensation. When excess compensation levels are low, there is little motivation to keep compensation disclosure opaque. Managers are better off with increased transparency and maximizing the stock price of the firm by reducing information asymmetry between the firm and outside shareholders.
The opposite is true when managerial voting rights are high. As managerial voting control increases, their ability to extract excess compensation can expand. The marginal benefits of opaque disclosure to managers can outweigh any marginal costs such as any stock price declines due to increased information asymmetry. Managers therefore have an incentive to increase disclosure opacity by making compensation amounts appear as less excessive. While other explanations for this result are equally plausible, the preliminary evidence on the high compensation levels observed when managerial control rights are high seems to indicate that a concealment of excess compensation explanation for the disclosure findings cannot be ruled out.
To summarize, this study makes three important contributions to the literature on voluntary disclosure and ownership structure. First, a major contribution of this study is the development of a contextual measure of compensation disclosure and its applicability in a setting where the potential for private rents are high. 5 A second contribution of this study is that it is the earliest attempt to document that the mechanism through which managerial ownership is concentrated (i.e. through dual class equity) is an important determinant of voluntary disclosure. 6 Finally the study documents that compensation disclosure is negatively associated with the level of managerial voting control and positively associated with the level of managerial cash flow rights in dual class share firms. Separating these two effects has always been an empirical challenge in prior literature and this study helps resolve some of those challenges.
Institutional background of dual class equity structures in the United States
During the 1980s in the United States, the dual-class structure became a primary mechanism to prevent hostile takeover bids. Since most firms had only a single class of stock, they implemented the dual-class structure through various recapitalization techniques where existing shareholders were effectively coerced into giving up their voting rights. In order to remain competitive with the American Stock Exchange (AMEX) and the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD), the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), which had since banned dual class equity, relaxed its voting policies and allowed securities with disparate voting rights to be listed as long as they met certain conditions. By 1986, all three exchanges were allowing dual class shares to be issued. 5 A similar compensation disclosure measure has been developed in a recent study by Laksmana (2008) . A subset of the disclosures in her study also appears in the disclosure index independently developed in this study. 6 A study by Lee (2007) documents a negative association between disclosure and control divergence in Asian firms. His study uses S&P disclosure scores as its measure of disclosure. The disclosure measure employed in this study is a contextually relevant measure given the research question i.e. it uses compensation disclosure to test if managers attempt to conceal excess compensation.
In December 1993, SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt Jr. suggested all US markets implement a uniform policy regarding voting rights. Despite the exchanges developing a uniform policy and preventing coercion through dual-class recapitalizations, the structure still receives criticism. The critics call for a one-vote-oneshare standard and point to the anti-takeover property of the structure, the risk of entrenchment, and potential expropriation of minority shareholders. They contend insiders with control will take on bad projects, reject sound takeover offers, or just not run the firm effectively. Although the structure has received much criticism and the risk of hostile takeovers have dramatically declined since the 1980s, many publicly traded firms still choose to use the dual-class structure, including firms such as Google, News Corporation, and Blockbuster.
While dual class equity structures are frequently found in countries such as Sweden, Brazil and South Africa, they still represent a sizeable number in the US given the size of the US economy. In other parts of the world, many other structures other than dual class equity allow control rights to be separated from cash flow rights. Such structures typically involve pyramids and cross-ownership.
7 Both pyramiding and cross-ownership are not common in the United States due to legal restrictions but are far more frequent in some European countries such as Italy and some East Asian economies (Claessens et al. 2000; Bianchi et al. 2001) . The existence of extreme governance structures such as dual class equity in the United States provides a convenient setting to test how such firms compare with one-voteone-share firms when it comes to reporting and disclosure. This is because identifying a comparable control sample of truly one-vote-one-share firms may be challenging in other legal regimes such as parts of Europe and East Asia where a large number of listed firms are characterized by control divergence either through pyramids, cross-ownership, dual class equity or some combination of these. 
Literature review
The emphasis on compensation disclosures in this study is a relatively new direction in the literature on the accounting consequences of control divergence. Prior empirical research in this area has been limited to studying earnings informativeness and earnings management. Haw et al. (2004) focus on earnings management as a mechanism for masking the private benefits that result from control divergence. Fan and Wong (2002) , while examining East Asian firms with concentrated ownership structures achieved by cross-holdings and stock pyramids, find that the 7 With a pyramid structure, a controlling stake is held in a holding company, which in turn holds a controlling stake in another firm. Cross-ownership occurs when a firm owns portions of other firms in which it does business. In this way, the management group can maintain tight control of the firm through its relationships with its other companies. 8 The preponderance of dual class structures in other legal regimes may allow a researcher to circumvent the problem of identifying one-vote-one-share firms by examining recapitalizations and unifications of dual class structures. These events may provide unique opportunities to implement time-series analyses and obtain stronger causal inferences on the relationship between such structures or the lack of such structures and issues of reporting and disclosure.
Voluntary disclosure and ownership structure 377 entrenchment that results from a controlling shareholder's ability to act in selfinterest dominates any incentive alignment effects that result from high managerial ownership. This results in lower credibility of accounting earnings. Others such as Francis et al. (2005) have focused on the lack of credibility in earnings (as measured by earnings response coefficients) that results from dual class ownership structures. This study extends the above evidence to include implications of control divergence for voluntary compensation disclosure while exploiting the unique characteristics of these structures to better understand incentive alignment and entrenchment effects as manifested in disclosure. The literature on ownership structure and disclosure is relatively scarce. Most prior studies have chosen to focus only on the level (e.g. investment fund ownership as in Makhija and Patton 2004) or on the type of ownership (e.g. family ownership as in Ashiq et al. 2007; Chau and Gray 2002) and their association with voluntary disclosure. Separating the incentive alignment and entrenchment effects on disclosure has often plagued some of the prior literature which has used single class share firms to examine this issue. Makhija and Patton, using a sample of single class Czech companies with exogenously determined investment fund ownership, employ a linear model with squared ownership variables to tease out these two effects. They find evidence that public disclosure in annual reports is negatively related to high investment fund ownership and positively related to low investment fund ownership. They attribute this to the fact that at high levels of ownership, the desire to consume private rents (entrenchment) dominate the share price benefits (incentive alignment) and vice versa. However, because the power and influence that lead to entrenchment typically emanates from the decision rights held in a firm and because these rights are not separable from equity rights in their empirical design, their evidence cannot be interpreted as direct. Dual class equity helps resolve this empirical challenge by breaking the link between voting rights and cash flow rights.
Theoretical development

Compensation disclosures and dual class equity
As managers' voting control increases, they become more entrenched, and their ability to expropriate minority shareholder increases. As managerial cash flow rights decrease, their wealth is less tied to the company, thus their incentives become less aligned with minority shareholders. Since dual class share firms typically feature ownership structures where managers possesses voting rights far in excess of their cash flow rights, it can be argued that their ability to divert corporate resources outweigh any incentives to act in the interests of outside shareholders (DeAngelo and DeAngelo 1985; Grossman and Hart 1988) .
These increased agency costs due to separating control rights from cash flow rights may influence the disclosure policy in two competing ways. Jensen and Meckling's (1976) agency theory suggests that when agency costs increase due to poor governance structures such as in dual class share firms, managers will voluntarily bond themselves to better governance structures e.g. a more transparent disclosure policy as a form of commitment to consume fewer private benefits. Disclosure and good governance structures are mere substitutes according to this approach. A large branch of empirical literature on the substitutability of control mechanisms gives credence to this view Moyer et al. 1992) . Transparent disclosure leads to higher share prices because a reduction in informational asymmetry brings about greater liquidity, which, in turn, lowers the cost of capital and raises share prices. These relations among information asymmetry, liquidity, and stock prices have been developed in a number of studies, including Demsetz (1968) and Glosten and Milgrom (1985) .
The other competing explanation relates to the possibility that managers may adopt disclosure choices that increase the opaqueness of the firm's disclosure, especially if the disclosures relate to areas where their private benefits may most likely be manifested e.g. executive compensation. In other words, opaque disclosure and poor governance structures are complimentary in the rent extraction process.
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Dual class equity structures permit extraction of rents while opaque disclosures help managers protect these rents. Extraction of rents may be costly if rents are easily observable to outsiders. Bebchuk and Fried (2003) argue that to avoid or minimize the outrage that results from outsiders' recognition of rent extraction, managers have a substantial incentive to obscure and try to legitimize-or, more generally, to ''camouflage''-their extraction of rents. Watts and Zimmerman (1986) suggests that politicians, shareholders, regulators and employees have the ability to impose non-pecuniary costs (through increased monitoring and regulation) on the executive and corporation when compensation to executives is perceived to be ''excessive''. Murphy (1996) provides a lucid explanation by arguing that although ''receiving higher levels of compensation presumably increases managerial utility, reporting higher levels of compensation decreases managerial utility.'' From the above, it is clear that transparency (opaqueness) can increase (decrease) stock price benefits and decrease (increase) private benefits. Given these costs and benefits of opaque and transparent disclosure, the act of making voluntary disclosure decisions represents the outcome of some constrained optimization problem, wherein managers evaluate the cost-benefit relationship and decide whether to choose opaque or transparent disclosure (Waymire 1985) . Managers thus actively trade off the increased benefits of transparency with the loss in private benefits that might occur with such transparency. An opaque disclosure policy would be consistent with the explanation that the marginal private benefits to managers from opaque disclosure are high enough to outweigh the marginal costs of opaque disclosure such as any forgone stock price increases.
Prior literature argues that these marginal private benefits are high in dual class share firms. Consequently, any disclosure that increases the cost of extracting these private benefits can reduce the magnitude of the net control benefits accruing to managers. For dual class share firms that are often perceived as poor governance structures, these costs can be severe and can result in high political costs in the form of increased regulation, monitoring, taxes, adverse media publicity, shareholder lawsuits or in the extreme, even a clamor for banning dual class equity. It would thus be reasonable to argue that such firms would more likely be characterized by opaque disclosure, particularly in areas where private benefit opportunities may most likely exist e.g. as in executive compensation.
The first hypothesis is therefore stated as:
Hypothesis 1 Compensation disclosures are more likely to be opaque in dual class share firms than in single class share firms.
4.2 Compensation disclosures and managers' control rights Bebchuk et al. (2002b) argue that executive compensation patterns are more consistent with executives who have control over their own boards, and who maximize their own compensation rather than the standard optimal contracting view where executives negotiate contracts with shareholders that provide incentives that motivate them to maximize the shareholders' welfare. I argue that this tendency for executives to maximize their own compensation is likely to be more severe when executives hold high levels of decision or voting rights in the firm. High control rights may enable executives to wield substantial power and influence over their boards and extract excessive compensation. Consequently, executives may likely try to avoid or minimize the ''outrage costs'' that often results from outsiders' recognition of such high compensation by opting for opaque compensation disclosure. Of course, opaque disclosure can be costly in terms of its adverse effects on stock price. As discussed before, managers trade off the adverse stock price effects of opaque disclosure with the protection in private control benefits that is facilitated by such opaqueness. When decision rights are concentrated and compensation levels are high, potential outrage costs from outside shareholders can be severe and an opaque compensation disclosure policy can significantly mitigate these costs. Managers therefore likely choose opaque disclosure over transparent disclosure when managerial control rights are high. Yet another explanation argues that firms which possess significant proprietary information often concentrate voting rights so as to maintain tighter control of information flows (Jensen and Meckling 1992; Christie et al. 2003; Fan and Wong 2002) . Thus, concentrated voting rights may simply be a proxy for sensitive proprietary information within the firm. Compensation disclosures that are too transparent may reveal commercially sensitive information to the detriment of both the firm and its shareholders. For example, many firms do not provide any details regarding bonus related performance targets on the grounds of them being sensitive information.
Both the above explanations point to a negative association between compensation disclosures and voting control. It is not clear which of these explanations is more consistent with the data. In this study, I attempt to throw some light on this issue by examining the relationship between compensation levels and managers' voting rights within dual class share firms. A positive association between executive compensation levels and managers' voting rights may indicate that the desire to conceal excess compensation cannot be ruled out as a potential explanation for the disclosure hypothesis as presented in H2A below:
Hypothesis 2A Compensation disclosure is negatively associated with managers' voting rights.
Compensation disclosures and managers' cash flow rights
As cash flow rights of managers increase, managerial wealth is more tied to the company and hence their incentives to extract private benefits in the form of excess compensation may diminish. Private benefits are low which may lead stock price benefits of increased transparency to outweigh any loss of some minor private benefits that may come with such transparency. This supply-based explanation argues a positive association between compensation disclosure levels and managerial cash flow rights. An alternative demand-based explanation is provided by Warfield et al. (1995) . Using mostly single class share firms, they predict that high managerial cash flow rights ownership decreases the demand for information used to constrain managers' opportunism. They posit that the demand for information declines with greater cash flow rights ownership because of perceived incentive alignment between managers and shareholders. This explanation argues a negative association between compensation disclosure and managerial cash flow rights. However, investors' perceptions of high managerial cash flow rights in one-voteone-share firms are probably quite different from investors' perceptions of high managerial cash flow rights in dual class share firms. This is because of the negative publicity that is often associated with the latter. 10 The demand for disclosure is therefore unlikely to significantly wane in dual class share firms. Consequently, we expect the supply effect of increased disclosure to dominate any demand effects of reduced disclosure, which leads us to the prediction as stated in Hypothesis 2B.
Hypothesis 2B Compensation disclosure is positively associated with managers' cash flow rights.
The disclosure index
Construction of the disclosure index
As discussed in the theoretical review, opaque disclosures can make compensation amounts appear less excessive and serve as a channel for misrepresenting true compensation. This reduces the non-pecuniary costs of high perceived compensation according to Murphy (1996) . In order for this theoretical view of opaque disclosure to be consistent with the empirical proxy of disclosure, I focus on disclosures in the Compensation Committee Report that highlight the compensation 10 Some institutional investors still view dual class equity structures as value reducing governance mechanisms, as illustrated by both TIAA-CREF's and CalPERS' public opposition to such structures. Osterland (2001) reports that some institutional investors refuse to even invest in dual class firms. Associates 2006) . Thus the disclosure opacity measures used in this study are still valid under the new disclosure regime. The compensation disclosure index (DDCOMP) focuses on disclosures that highlight the policies for determining executive compensation, the specific relationship of performance to compensation and description of specific criteria for awarding compensation. It is constructed as the sum of all the points associated with each disclosure item divided by the maximum possible disclosure score.
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The disclosure items relate generally to the following compensation areas: A more detailed description of each of the disclosure variables and examples thereof is listed in Appendices 1 and 2.
Validity of the disclosure index
Because the development and application of disclosure indices requires subjective assessments by the researcher applying the technique, it is important to assess the validity of the resulting measure. To examine whether the disclosure index truly measures disclosure levels, I examine the validity of the disclosure measures in the spirit of Botosan (1997) . First, I correlate the disclosure indices with analyst following covered by the Institutional Brokers' System Database (IBES).
12 As seen in the correlation matrix of Table 1 , consistent with Lang and Lundholm's (1996) finding that larger numbers of analysts are attracted to more forthcoming firms, I find that analyst following is positively correlated with the compensation disclosure index and the correlation is significant at the 5 % level. Second, Ahmed and Courtis (1999) in a meta-analysis of 23 separate studies finds that firm size, leverage and listing status have a statistically significant positive association with disclosure levels. If my disclosure index measures disclosure levels, then it should be correlated with these characteristics. Table 1 lists the correlation coefficients between the disclosure index and firm size and leverage. The listing status variable is excluded from the analysis because all firms in the sample are listed firms. Firm size and leverage are positively correlated with the compensation disclosure index and the correlations are significant at the 1 % level and 10 % level respectively. Finally, Botosan computes a Cronbach's coefficient Alpha-a measure of internal consistency to assess the degree to which correlation among the measurements is attenuated due to random error. The Alpha for the 11 compensation disclosure variables is 0.53 while the Alpha in the Botosan study was 0.64. While usually an Alpha of 0.7 and above is considered desirable (Nunnally 1978) , those between 0.5 and 0.7 are considered acceptable and indicate good internal consistency (Novella et al. 2001; Bowling 1997 ). Thus, a coefficient alpha of 0.53 only suggests that random measurement error could make the disclosure items less homogenous and reduce the power of the empirical tests that follow.
One implication of this lack of homogeneity is that the disclosure items may not have enough empirical power to adequately capture the perception of excess compensation. To investigate this issue further, univariate correlations between each disclosure item and an excess compensation variable (see Appendix 4) are calculated. Seven out of the eleven disclosure items are negatively correlated and statistically significant at the 10 % level, three are negatively correlated but are not statistically significant and one item is marginally positively correlated and not statistically significant. The correlation between the disclosure index and the excess compensation variable as listed in Table 1 is -0.07 and is statistically significant at the 5 % level. These results confirm the possibility of managers using these disclosures to obfuscate the perception of excess compensation as claimed in this study.
I also correlate the compensation disclosure index with other disclosure measures such as the frequency and occurrence of management earnings forecast guidance issued by companies. If the compensation disclosure index truly measures disclosure levels, then I expect the two disclosure measures to be positively correlated with the compensation disclosure index. I find that the correlation of the compensation disclosure index with the frequency of forecast guidance is positive and significant at the 5 % level while that with the occurrence of earnings forecast guidance is positive and significant at the 1 % level. companies on an unprecedented scale. Compensation levels of CEO's were extreme-average remuneration (at 2002-constant dollars) for the CEOs of S&P 500 firms increased from about $850,000 in 1970 to more than $14 m in 2000, falling to $9.4 m in 2002. Agency problems were likely severe during this period than in other periods and therefore empirically detecting its implications for reporting and compensation amounts during this period would be easier than in other periods. Thus, 2000-2001 was chosen as the sample period to acquire more power for the empirical tests. Firms with two classes or more classes of common stock are identified from the database used in Gompers et al. (2003) of shareholder rights which is publicly available. 254 firms with dual class shares are identified. Three firms are eliminated with more than two classes of common stock. Twelve firms are eliminated which have provisions in their authorized capital to issue shares with superior voting rights but no such shares were issued as on the fiscal year end. Twenty-Nine firms were eliminated for which no proxy statements were available on the EDGAR database filings and thus no ownership or disclosure data could be collected. This resulted in a final sample of 210 dual class share firms.
For each dual class share firm, a single class share control firm was identified within the same two-digit SIC code which has the closest total assets (Compustat data item 6) to the dual class share firm. A range of 65 and 135 % of the total assets of the dual class share firm was used to identify a control firm.
14 The dual class sample is almost perfectly matched to single class firms on size and industry for all firms except eight.
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For each dual class and its single class share firm counterpart, disclosure and ownership data is collected from the proxy statements. Institutional ownership is extracted from the Thomson-Reuters database. The executive compensation data is collected from the Execucomp database. However, Execucomp covers only 235 of the 420 firms in the sample. For the remaining 185 firms, the compensation data is hand collected for the five highly paid executives in the firm for the fiscal years ending 1998-2000. 16,17 Annual stock returns in executive compensation regressions are computed from CRSP. Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the size-industry matched sample. The definition and construction of the variables in Table 2 is listed in Appendix 4. The Compensation Disclosure Index (DDCOMP) is significantly higher for single class share firms than for dual class share firms. Dual class share firms are on average older than single class share firms. Controlling shareholders who have large amounts of firmspecific human capital invested are more likely to adopt dual class structures in an attempt to protect those investments from outside raiders (Taylor and Whittred 1998). 14 To ensure that the one-vote-one-share feature of single class share firm was preserved, firms which exhibited features of control pyramids were excluded. Control pyramids can create a control divergence effect similar to that in dual class firms. 15 These eight firms were randomly chosen without replacement using the Proc surveyselect command in SAS. 16 Compensation data is analyzed for 3 years instead of a single year, to acquire more empirical power for the tests. 17 Option grant values are calculated using modified Black-Scholes model described in the Compustat documentation. Dual class firms also have a higher level of intangibles in their asset structures. This is possibly due to an industry effect, given the preponderance of dual class share firms in the media industry which is characterized by a lower level of tangible assets. The ownership statistics in Table 2 also reveal the higher concentrated managerial ownership in dual class firms relative to their single class counterparts. The median percentage of cash flow rights ownership figures are similar to those observed in Francis et al. (2005) -11.5 and 29.8 % for single and dual respectively for their study compared to 11 and 27 % for this study. Consistent with Amoako-Adu and Smith (2001), a dual class share firm is more likely to be family owned than a single class share firm.
18 68 out of 210 single class share firms are family owned while 164 out of 210 dual class share firms are family owned. Having a large number of single class firms that are also family owned allow us to isolate better, the implications of dual class share ownership for voluntary disclosure. Transient institutional ownership is also higher in dual class firms indicating that some firms may adopt dual class equity to protect against myopic expectations of some institutional investors.
As observed in Table 2 , corporate governance structures are generally weaker in dual class firms than in single class firms. Dual class share firms have larger board sizes, lesser proportion of independent directors and are more likely to have the controlling shareholder as the CEO. There is also preliminary evidence in the univariate analyses to show that managers in dual class share firms earn significantly higher excessive compensation than those in single class share firms. For dual class share firms, median total cash compensation i.e. TCC (US$400,000) is higher than the median TCC (US$377,310) for single class share firms. When option grants and other compensation amounts are considered along with cash compensation (i.e., TDC1), the differences are significant only at the 10 % level. However, the multivariate analyses in Table 4 document significant excessive TDC1 levels for dual class share firms relative to single class share firms. Table 2 also looks at the structure of the compensation contracts in dual and single class share firms. Dual class managers have a lower proportion of performance based bonuses in their compensation contracts. Founding families being more effective monitors of management can reward their managers based on information about managers' effort obtained through direct monitoring. Performance-based CEO pay is therefore likely smaller in family firms. Since many dual class share firms are family owned, we see this pattern of compensation structure for dual class share firms as well.
Empirical tests
Estimation methods
To investigate the association of voluntary compensation disclosure and dual class equity, an OLS model is used with DDCOMP as the dependent variable. The model can be described as:
The regression model for modeling compensation disclosure choices within dual class share firms is:
In (1) and (2), Dual = 1 if the firm has a dual equity structure; 0 otherwise. Voting Control and Management Ownership are the proportion of voting rights and cash flow rights held by managers in the firm. The control variables used in (1) and (2) are described below. Detailed construction of all regression variables is described in Appendix 4. Ashiq et al. (2007) provide evidence that family firms are less likely to disclose information about their corporate governance practices. Executive compensation is an integral aspect of corporate governance. As in Amoako-Adu and Smith (2001) , a dummy variable is coded as 1 if the largest controlling shareholder is an individual or family; 0 otherwise.
Family Firm
External Financing Firms with a higher projected need for external financing and thus more likely to approach capital markets will make greater disclosures (Frankel et al. 1995 ). An outcome based measure is avoided because it is possible that good disclosure practices lead to greater external financing demand. Instead, a predicted measure of external financing based on Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) is calculated. See Appendix 4 for detailed construction.
Firm Size Larger firms which are complex are expected to have greater disclosure (Lang and Lundholm 1993) . Log of total assets is used to proxy for firm size.
Return on Equity More profitable firms could be expected to have greater disclosure (Lang and Lundholm 1993) . However the litigation hypothesis argues that poorly performing firms choose greater disclosure in order to avoid subsequent legal liability. Return on Equity is calculated as Net Income (Loss) divided by Shareholders' Equity.
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Asset Intangibility A proxy for firm growth is the proportion of intangible assets. This is calculated as the (1 -Net Property Plant and Equipment/Total Assets). Growth can increase the demand for disclosure from potential investors who wish to acquire more information on the investment opportunity set of the firm.
Sales Growth Sales growth is used an alternative proxy for firm growth and is measured as the average growth rate in the sales over the past 2 years.
Leverage Highly levered firms are likely to face increased demand for disclosures from debt providers who want to protect their interests (Jensen and Meckling 1976) . Ahmed and Courtis (1999) in a meta-analysis of 23 separate studies finds that overall leverage has a significant positive association with disclosure. This is calculated as proportion of long-term debt to total assets.
Big 5 Audit Firm Large international auditors, such as the Big 5 accounting firms, are expected to insist on greater public disclosure, because they have more valuable reputations to maintain and reduce their legal liability (DeAngelo 1981) . A dummy variable is included if the auditor is a Big 5 auditor.
Analyst Following Analysts have a lot of demand for information in order to make stock recommendations and arrive at price targets. Demand for disclosure is thus expected to increase with analyst following. This is calculated as the number of analysts following the firm in the year.
Institutional Ownership Institutional ownership can act as an important source of external governance. They can constrain managers to make frequent disclosures. El-Gazzar (1998) argues that large institutional ownership may induce a higher level of voluntary disclosure. This is calculated as the proportion of cash flow rights held in the firm by all institutions.
Firm Age Older mature firms are less likely to compensate employees with equity options and more with cash compensation due to fewer investment opportunities. Since the disclosure index mainly includes disclosures on cash compensation, we would expect a positive association between disclosure and the age of the firm. Firm age is measured as the log of the number of years from the year of incorporation.
Proportion of Performance-Based Compensation Performance based managerial pay should be significantly smaller for family firms due to direct monitoring of managers' effort by founding families. Because the disclosure index contains disclosures based on performance based bonuses and dual class firms are largely family owned, the disclosure regressions may be sensitive to the compensation contracts in each firm. I therefore use the proportion of performance based compensation to total compensation as a control variable.
To document that the negative association between compensation disclosures and dual class equity may be driven by excessive compensation policies in dual class share firms, I regress the total direct compensation (TDC1) of each of the top 5 executives on the dual class firm binary variable and a comprehensive list of control variables suggested by prior literature (e.g., Murphy 1985; Smith and Watts 1992; Core et al. 1999) . 19 The regression model used for modeling the association of executive compensation levels with dual class equity is:
The regression model used for modeling the association of executive compensation levels with voting control and cash flow incentives within dual class share firms is:
The dependent variable TDC1 is measured for each of the top five highly paid executives in a firm for each year while the independent variables are calculated at the level of each firm-year. I expect the firm-level observations for compensation across years to be correlated for each manager. This violates the independence assumption between the residuals and the independent variables and produces biased standard errors. I control for this bias by using clustered standard errors as suggested by Petersen (2009) with clustering at the level of each executive.
Econometric problems
In a perfect world with exogenous ownership structures, a simple cross-sectional regression of compensation or compensation disclosures on ownership factors should provide unbiased coefficients on all the explanatory variables. However, there are two such problems with this approach. I discuss each of these below along with their solutions.
Endogeneity of Ownership Structure Empirical studies involving ownership structure suffer from the perennial problems of endogeneity (Himmelberg et al. 1999) . It is possible that endogeneity can confound the results observed in this study. For example in the compensation regressions, both compensation and equity ownership are substitutes in incentivizing managers and thus are jointly determined (Bryan et al. 2000) . Furthermore, managers may choose to hold a large number of votes when excess compensation levels are high so as to protect these private rents from corporate raiders. In other words, voting rights are an outcome of the executive compensation levels.
In the disclosure regressions, the concern is that controlling owners may have incentives to obfuscate disclosure to preserve proprietary information or trade favors with politicians and bureaucrats in order to discourage entry by competitors (Morck 1996; Christie et al. 2003; Fan and Wong 2002) . However, opaque disclosure policies can be sustained over time only if decision rights are concentrated inside the firm to a chosen few so as to maintain tighter control of information flows to the public. Concentrated voting rights may thus be an outcome of disclosure policies that are less transparent.
Sample Selection Bias Sample selection bias refers to the distortion of evidence that may arise from the manner in which data is collected thereby resulting in a biased sample. For example, the decision to analyze disclosure within dual class share firms is motivated by an attempt to isolate the incentive alignment and entrenchment effects of ownership structure as manifested in disclosure. While these inferences can yield useful insights, they are clouded by the possibility that dual class share firms are inherently different and thus these results may not generalize to the relationship between compensation disclosure and ownership structure in general. This induces biased sampling that may cause measures of statistical significance to appear stronger than they actually are. Sample selection bias makes causation from ownership structure to disclosure or compensation levels difficult to prove.
For example, suppose that there is no significant association between compensation disclosure and managers' voting control, but that such a relationship exists only in the media industry. Perhaps the outrage costs in the media industry are more sensitive to the managerial decision rights held in the firm than in other industries. Then since media firms are overrepresented among dual-class firms, we could observe a negative association between compensation disclosure and managerial voting control, but it would be incorrect to extend this finding to all the firms. A similar bias may also exist in the compensation regressions in (4).
Resolving Endogeneity and Sample Selection Bias While analyzing dual class firms, Gompers et al. (2010) argue that endogeneity and sample selection bias are two distinct and separate econometric problems. For example it is possible that there is no endogeneity in the within-dual class analysis but the relation between disclosure or compensation and ownership structure in dual class firms cannot be generalized to all the firms in the universe. On the other hand, it is possible that the results may be generalized to other firms but ownership structure is endogenously determined for all the firms in the universe.
Consistent with Gompers et al. (2010) , endogeneity in the disclosure and compensation regressions is accounted for using two-stage Instrumental Variables (IV) regressions. Sample selection bias in the within-dual class analyses is accounted for using the two-step methods of Heckman (1979) . While the IV methodologies are estimated on the matched sample, the sample used to calculate the Inverse Mills Ratio in the Heckman analysis includes all the Compustat firms including the matched sample firms. This is because generalizing the within-dual class sample results to other firms necessitates the application of the Heckman analysis to all the firms in the universe. It should be noted that the Heckman analysis can only adjust for sample selection bias based on observable characteristics. If there is selection bias on unobservable characteristics that are omitted from the selection equation then these methods would not control for it. To implement the IV and Heckman methods we need to analyze the determinants of ownership structure. Doing this would enable us to obtain the first-stage regressions that we will need to have to correct for endogeneity or any sample selection biases. The determinants of ownership structure are therefore discussed below. Gompers et al. (2010) argue that the dual class equity choice and the subsequent ownership structure at the time of IPO is an outcome of the negotiations between insiders who want to preserve their private benefits of control and private investors who want to maximize their post-IPO share price. If the private benefits of control are larger than the aggregate reduction in share value, then insiders' actively bargain with investors to obtain a dual class structure at the IPO stage. Gompers et al. then identify the characteristics of firms for which these private benefits of control would be large. They estimate regressions of Dual, Voting Control and Management Ownership on firm, industry or market characteristics measured at the time of firm's IPO and use it as their first-stage selection model. Similar to their approach, I estimate the following regression model as the first-stage regression.
Determinants of Ownership Structure
Ownership Structure is the variable Dual in the dual versus single class analysis and the variables Voting Control and Management Ownership in the within-dual class analyses. All other variables are as described in Gompers et al. (2010) . A brief description and construction of these variables is discussed in Appendix 3. Similar to their study, all the variables are measured for the year prior to the firm's IPO. So each variable is assumed to have held constant from the IPO year up to the sample years, 2000 and 2001. For the dual class versus single class analysis, the selection models for the Compustat sample and the matched sample are estimated using a Probit and a conditional logit model respectively, with the dependent variable as Dual.
21 Generally the IV and Heckman type analyses generate more credible 20 Equation (5) is designed to predict ownership at the time of IPO. To the extent that some dual-class structures are adopted long after the IPO, the selection model may not be complete in capturing all causal factors of dual class equity. 21 Cram et al. (2009) recommend the use of a conditional logit model when matched samples are used.
Voluntary disclosure and ownership structure 393 estimates with an exclusion restriction i.e. the use of variables which essentially act as instruments (Pearl 2000; Puhani 2000) . A subset of the explanatory variables in (5) is excluded in the second stage. 22 The key assumption for these excluded variables is that they are not correlated with the error in the disclosure or compensation regressions. To ensure that the instruments are uncorrelated with the error in the second stage regressions, overidentification tests are also performed where possible. Table 3 describes the determinants of dual class equity, which is important for arriving at the first-stage selection regressions needed to control for endogeneity and sample selection bias. The Probit regression results in the Compustat sample in Column (1) are very similar to the results observed in Gompers et al. (2010) . The coefficient on Media is positive and significant. Private benefit opportunities are high in the media industry (Demsetz and Lehn 1985) and firms are more likely to adopt dual class equity to protect these benefits. The coefficient on Name is also positive and significant. A firm named after one of its insiders is a signal for high private benefits. Such firms are more likely to adopt dual class equity. The coefficient on % Sales is positive and significant. Gompers et al. attribute this to the possibility that firms are more likely to adopt dual class equity when there are large local firms that may increase takeover threats for the firm. The coefficient on SalesRank is negative and significant consistent with the explanation that older firms are less likely to have founders who are active. These firms are likely to be characterized by fewer private benefits of control and thus are less likely to adopt dual class equity. Matching the sample on size and industry eliminates the statistical significance of many of the explanatory variables in the Compustat sample regressions. This is infact a desirable result. It implies that matching can eliminate some of the differences in observable characteristics between the single and dual class share firms, thereby strengthening the efforts to control for endogeneity. However, the coefficient on Name is positive although weakly significant (at the 11 % level) while the coefficient on Media is positive and strongly significant.
Discussion of empirical results
Determinants of dual class equity
Executive compensation in dual class share firms
The evidence in Panel A of Table 4 shows that managers in dual class share firms earn significantly higher compensation than those in single class share firms after controlling for size, performance, industry effects and other firm-specific characteristics, thereby indicating that the costs of reporting high compensation levels for dual class firms may be significant. Column (1) in Panel A shows that a dual class manager earns on average $154,000 more every year in total compensation than a manager in a single class share firm. The coefficient of 153.87 on Dual is positive and significant at the 5 % level. The traditional determinants of executive compensation such as firm size, firm performance and growth are in the expected direction. The coefficients on market capitalization, annual stock return, lagged annual stock return and market-to-book ratio are all positive and significant. The This table reports the results of a cross-sectional probit regression and a cross-sectional conditional logit model where the dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to one when the firm has dual class equity and zero otherwise. The probit regression on all the Compustat firms is estimated in Column (1) and conditional logit regressions on the matched sample firms is estimated in Column (2). Name is a dummy variable for firms with family names at the time of CRSP listing. Media is a dummy variable for firms in media industries at the time of CRSP listing. Media industries are defined as SIC codes 2710-2711, 2720-2721, 2730-2731, 4830, 4832-4833, 4840-4841, 7810, 7812, and 7820 . StateLaw is an index of state takeover laws defined in Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) from the firm's state of incorporation in the previous year. SalesRank is the firm's percentile of sales in its first year appearing in Compustat in the distribution of all other firms new to Compustat. ProfitRank is the analogous percentile for income before extraordinary items available for common. %Firms is the percentage of firms located in this firm's county in the year prior to its first appearance in Compustat relative to all firms in Compustat during that year. %Sales is the analogous figure for revenue. Sales/CountySales is sales divided by total sales in this firm's county. Dummy variables for the 48 industries designated by Fama and French (1997) are also included in the regressions but these coefficients are omitted from the table. A property of the conditional logit model is that the intercept cannot be estimated and thus the intercept plays no role in determining the conditional likelihoods. Thus no intercept term is reported in Column (2). Significant results (at 10 % level or better) are shown in boldface. Significance at the 10, 5 and 1 % levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively
Voluntary disclosure and ownership structure 395 Return Volatility is the annualized standard deviation of daily stock returns for the past 3 years. SalesRank is the firm's percentile of sales in its first year appearing in Compustat in the distribution of all other firms new to Compustat. Inverse Mills Ratio is calculated from a sample which includes all the Compustat firms. Industry dummy variables are based on 2-digit SIC codes. Standard errors are robust and clustered at the level of each executive. Significant results (at 10 % level or better) are shown in boldface. *, **, and *** respectively indicate significance levels at 10, 5, and 1 % levels. Appendix 4 lists the definition and construction of all variables in detail significant and negative coefficient on institutional ownership concentration is consistent with the evidence in Hartzell and Starks (2003) confirming the monitoring role that institutions play in reigning in excess compensation. The coefficient on family firm dummy is negative and significant. This is consistent with the arguments proposed by Demsetz (1983) .
23
Column (2) in Panel A shows the results after controlling for endogeneity using the instrumental variables estimation of average treatment effects as described in Wooldridge (2002: 622-625) . The results are similar to those in Column (1). The coefficient on management ownership is negative and significant. The result is consistent with both an optimal contracting view as well as a managerial opportunism view. 24 The IV estimates are also much higher than the OLS estimates and the standard errors that are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity are also smaller. The coefficient on Dual of 690.38 is positive and significant at the 1 % level. To summarize, Panel A in Table 4 indicates that managers in dual class share firms extract excess compensation and potentially face significant costs of reporting such compensation.
Panel B of Table 4 reports an analysis of executive compensation levels within dual class share firms. An initial investigation (unreported) showed that compensation levels are unrelated to the ownership variables. However, while analyzing dual class firms, we are mixing several different ownership structures. Gompers et al. (2010) argue that this can cloud inferences. To ensure homogeneity in the sample, I therefore exclude firms with negative or zero control divergence because these are likely to be firms where private benefits extraction may not be a motive for adopting dual class equity. Out of the 210 dual class firms, 35 firms that have negative or zero control divergence are excluded. The analysis reported in Panel B is therefore carried out on a sample of 175 dual class firms.
The OLS estimates for the association of voting control with total compensation are positive in Column (1), although weakly significant at 10 % level. A 1 % increase in insiders' voting control increases the compensation for an executive by nearly $538,000. The significance of the coefficient disappears when a Heckman correction term is included to control for sample selection bias in Column (2). The instrumental variables estimates on voting control again are positive and strongly significant. This is consistent with the explanation that power and influence through more decision rights enable managers to extract excess compensation. Because we cannot control for sample selection bias and endogeneity at the same time and it is likely that both these problems exist in this restricted sample, the positive association between compensation and voting control in Columns (1) and (3) should be treated with caution. The coefficient on cash flow rights is negative and 23 Demsetz (1983) argues that because a good part of owner-managers' lives in family firms are on the job, they may prefer on-the-job consumption to higher wages. Thus the lower executive compensation levels observed for family firms simply represent managerial preferences for lower take-home wages instead of on-the-job perquisites. 24 The optimal contracting view argues that both ownership and compensation are substitutes in incentivizing managers. Bebchuk et al. (2002a) argue that while the managerial opportunism view and the optimal contracts view are not mutually exclusive, managerial opportunism can better explain patterns and practices in executive compensation. significant in all the three columns. The result is consistent with both an optimal contracting view (which argues that both equity ownership and compensation are substitutes in incentivizing managers) as well as a managerial opportunism explanation. The coefficients on market capitalization, annual stock return and institutional ownership concentration are all significant and in the expected direction. The coefficient on return volatility is negative and significant but is counterintuitive. To the extent that higher firm-specific return volatility reflects higher idiosyncratic risk, undiversified managers should demand higher compensation. On the other hand, higher uncertainty could attract more outsider monitoring which in turn could induce lower compensation levels.
8.3 Compensation disclosure and dual class equity structures Table 5 exhibits the results of employing the disclosure regression model from equation (1). It shows that compensation disclosure levels are decreasing in dual class equity structures, consistent with the explanation that the desire to conceal private rents may induce more opacity in compensation disclosure. This is true for both the OLS and IV regressions in Columns (1) and (2). The negative coefficient on Dual is incremental to the effect of the level of managerial ownership as well as family ownership. This helps us conclude that the mechanism of concentrating ownership is an important determinant of disclosure policy. The coefficient on Family firm is also negative but is not significant in the presence of Dual and the management ownership variable.
The coefficient of 0.03 on firm age is positive and significant consistent with older firms disclosing more. Older firms are more likely to be mature firms and thus are more likely to compensate their executives with cash compensation rather than with option grants. Since the compensation disclosure index is heavily weighted towards discretionary disclosures relating to cash compensation, the positive coefficient on firm age possibly reflects the compensation policies of mature older firms. The coefficient on Firm Size, Leverage and External Financing are positive and significant in both OLS and IV regressions. The coefficients on the Proportion of Performance-based compensation are positive and significant consistent with the assertion that the disclosure measures used are sensitive to the unique compensation contracts that may be employed in dual class share firms. Dual class share firms being largely family owned are less likely to compensate employees through performance-based compensation. The goodness-of-fit measure for the disclosure regression (as indicated by adjusted R-square) is high indicating that the regression model is well specified.
The regressions in Table 5 have been performed on a composite disclosure score. A disaggregated analysis may help us better understand the results in Table 5 . Therefore, logistic regressions are run on each disclosure item (unreported). The results reveal that 4 of the 11 disclosure items have the most appreciable impact on the results in Table 5 . In particular, dual class firms are less likely to disclose the percentile at which cash compensation is offered relative to their peers (PERCEN-TILE), less likely to disclose information about their peers (CLARITY), less likely to disclose target bonus ranges as a percentage of base salaries (BONUS1) and less Voluntary disclosure and ownership structure 399
likely to disclose the specifics of the performance measures used in bonus compensation contracts (EXEC_SPECIFICS). Some measures such as the length of the narrative of the decision-making process in the award of compensation (DM_MGR) show little variation between dual and single class share firms. Interestingly, all 11 disclosure items show a negative sign on the Dual indicator variable, even though 7 of them are not significant or are only weakly significant. These results suggest that each disclosure item individually contributes to the results observed in Table 5 , even though a few disclosure items seem to contribute more than others.
To ensure that the negative association between disclosure and dual class equity structures may be driven by an incentive to conceal excess rents, it is important to document that a direct negative correlation exists between the compensation disclosure index and excess compensation. If high compensation is costly to Table 5 Regression of disclosure on dual class equity structure OLS regression (1) IV (2) Intercept 0.14*** disclose, then compensation disclosures should be negatively associated with excess compensation. Table 6 documents this result. The level of excess compensation is estimated as the residual from the compensation regressions in (3) with the ownership variables excluded. A pooled compensation regression is estimated for the years ending 1998 through 2000, the residuals are collected and then averaged across all the executives across the years to arrive at an average level of excess compensation for each firm. The results show a strong negative association between disclosure transparency and the level of excess compensation. The coefficient on the level of excess compensation is negative and significant at the 5 % level. Similar results obtain when total compensation is used in place of excess compensation.
Compensation disclosures within dual class share firms
To address the differential influence of voting control and cash flow incentives on compensation disclosure, an analysis is performed within the dual class sample. The results in Table 7 are generally consistent with the assertion that disclosure is (2) indicates the second-stage of an instrumental variables estimation where the first stage is modeled as a conditional logit model with Dual as the dependant variable and all the exogenous variables in the system as the explanatory variables i.e. all variables except Dual and Management Ownership. These include the determinants of dual class equity-Name, Media, %firms, %sales, Sales/County Sales, State Anti-takeover index, Sales Rank, Profit Rank and Fama-French Industry dummies as well as the other control variables in column (1). Dual is an indicator variable equal to one when the firm has dual class equity and zero otherwise. Family Firm is a dummy variable set to ''1'' if the largest shareholder is an individual or a family; ''0'' otherwise. Management Ownership is the cash flow rights held by all the insiders. External financing need is the predicted need for external financing as calculated by the difference between required investment and internally available capital. Firm Size is the log of total assets. Asset Intangibility is the proportion of assets in the firm that are not considered as fixed assets. Sales Growth is the average two year growth in sales. Leverage is the ratio of long term debt to total assets. Institutional Ownership is the proportion of cash flow rights held by all the institutions. Big 5 Audit firm is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the auditor is a Big 5 auditor; 0 otherwise. Return on Equity is the ratio of Net Income to average stockholders' equity. Firm Age is the natural log of number of years from the year of incorporation. Analyst Following is the number of analysts following the firm. Proportion of Performance-based compensation is the ratio of bonus compensation to total compensation where total compensation is the sum of Salary, Bonus, Other Annual Compensation, Value of Restricted Stock Granted, Value of Stock Options Granted (using Black-Scholes) and Long-Term Incentive Payouts. Standard errors are robust. Significant results (at 10 % level or better) are shown in boldface. *, **, and *** respectively indicate significance levels at 10, 5, and 1 % levels. Appendix 4 lists the definition and construction of all variables in more detail
Voluntary disclosure and ownership structure 401 Table 6 Regression of disclosure on excess compensation Assets. Market-to-Book Ratio is the ratio of Market Capitalization to Stockholders' equity. Firm Age is the natural log of number of years from the year of incorporation or the year founded whichever is higher. Institutional Ownership Concentration is the percentage of cash flow rights held by the top 5 institutions. Return Volatility is the annualized standard deviation of daily stock returns for the past 3 years. External financing need is the predicted need for external financing as calculated by the difference between required investment and internally available capital. Firm Size is the log of total assets. Asset Intangibility is the proportion of assets in the firm that are not considered as fixed assets. Sales Growth is the average two year growth in sales. Leverage is the ratio of long term debt to total assets. Institutional Ownership is the proportion of cash flow rights held by all the institutions. Big 5 Audit firm is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the auditor is a Big 5 auditor; 0 otherwise. Return on Equity is the ratio of Net Income to average stockholders' equity. Firm Age is the natural log of number of years from the year of incorporation. Analyst Following is the number of analysts following the firm. Proportion of Performance-based compensation is the ratio of bonus compensation to TDC1. Standard errors are robust. *, **, and *** respectively indicate significance levels at 10, 5, and 1 % levels. Appendix 3 lists the definition and construction of all variables in more detail. Significant results (at 10 % level or better) are shown in boldface decreasing in voting control and increasing in cash flow incentives. The coefficient on voting control is negative and significant while the coefficient on cash flow rights is positive and significant. This is true after controlling for both endogeneity and sample selection bias. The IV estimates are much larger the OLS regression estimates and the OLS regression-with-sample-selection estimates. As discussed in the theoretical development, the negative coefficient on voting control is consistent with multiple explanations-concealment of excess compensation, proprietary costs as well as a desire by some insiders to control the flow of information. However the positive association observed earlier in Panel B of Table 4 between compensation levels and voting rights strengths our conjecture that the incentives to conceal excess compensation are likely to be large in firms where managerial control rights are high and the negative association between disclosure and voting control may reflect attempts by managers to protect this excess compensation. The positive coefficients of 0.13, 0.14 and 0.98 on the cash flow rights variable are strongly significant in the OLS model-with and without the sample selection term included and the IV model. This is consistent with the explanation that the lower compensation levels that result from high equity ownership make it likely that loss of private rents are likely to be minimal, so managers are better off with increased transparency and maximizing the stock price of the firm. The coefficients on firm size, institutional ownership and the proportion of performance-based compensation are all positive and significant in the OLS regressions (both with and without a sample-correction term included) and in the IV regression.
9 Robustness tests 9.1 Measurement error and researcher-induced bias in the disclosure index To ensure that measurement error is not a problem, I transform the disclosure score into a tertiary (0, 1, 2) variable by coding all the scores above the 66th percentile score as High Disclosure, below the 33rd percentile as Low Disclosure and the rest as Moderate Disclosure. To the extent that measurement error is unlikely to be so extreme as to cause firms to dramatically move from one disclosure category to another, this mitigates the measurement error to some extent. I estimate ordered probit models with the transformed variable as the new dependant variable. The results are qualitatively unchanged. A first-year doctoral student in Accounting was also asked to recode the disclosure scores of 50 randomly chosen firms from the sample for the fiscal year ending 2000. 25 The correlation between the student's rescored index and the originally constructed index was almost 88 %. These analyses suggest that while some measurement error and unintentional bias may be unavoidable, it is unlikely to have a significant impact on the conclusions made in this study.
Overidentification tests
The choice of multiple instruments in the first stage provides an advantage for testing the exogeneity of the instruments used in the within-dual class analyses. I use the Hansen J-test as the overidentification test. The null hypothesis is that the instruments are exogenous and not correlated with the error in compensation or disclosure regressions. Dropping a few industry dummy variables in the first stage ensures that the group of instruments being used is exogenous. 
Alternative regression specifications
Regressions models were also implemented using just the raw sum of all the disclosure items. Here, because the disclosure score is in count data form, count data methodologies were used to estimate the models. Two commonly used count data models are the Poisson and Negative Binomial models. The results are qualitatively unchanged using these alternative specifications.
Change of disclosure regime
The enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002 in the US set a new path of enhanced disclosure for US firms, one that included the 2006 SEC overhaul of executive compensation. The new rules provide for greater narrative disclosures relating to policies and principles of executive compensation. However, the lack of informativeness and specificity in these disclosures is widespread even after the overhaul of these disclosure guidelines (Hewitt Associates 2006) . Nevertheless, to address this change in disclosure regime, a limited analysis on 50 randomly selected dual class and single class firms were carried out for a more recent period i.e. 2007. The results remained qualitatively unchanged.
Conclusions
Dual class share firms often feature ownership structures where managerial control rights are in excess of their cash flow rights thereby allowing managers to escape the wealth consequences of their own decisions. This creates a moral hazard type of an agency problem where managers have the ability and incentives to expropriate outside investors. Traditional principal agent models such as those of Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that when the potential for agency conflicts is high, principals can incur monitoring costs to monitor agents' actions. Agents can also incur bonding costs to bond themselves to better governance structures as a commitment to consume fewer private benefits e.g. better disclosure or contractual guarantees. In dual class share firms, monitoring through boards or external proxy contests can often be rendered ineffective or extremely costly due to the power and influence held by the managers in these firms over their boards. Consequently, outside investors may have to depend on bonding commitments provided by managers, say for example better disclosure. This study empirically shows that such disclosure commitments are unlikely to be forthcoming from managers in dual class share firms. I argue in this study that this happens because managers do not find it in their interest to incur these bonding costs because any net increments in their wealth which they may generate (by increasing disclosure, reducing the agency costs and thereby increasing the value of the firm) may not be as valuable to the managers as the perquisites given up. This study therefore empirically reinforces the perniciousness of dual class share type of ownership structures highlighted originally by DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1985) and Grossman and Hart (1988) , where both monitoring and bonding actions of the principal and the agent remain at sub-optimal levels resulting in potential wealth losses to outside investors. It is indeed confirmed in this study by the empirical documentation of high levels of excess compensation extracted by managers in these firms.
This study also exploits the unique ownership structure in dual class share firms to isolate the incentive alignment and entrenchment effects associated with ownership structure on disclosure. These two effects have been difficult to empirically disentangle in single class share firms because of the inseparability of control and cash flow rights. Dual class firms present a solution to this limitation in empirical design. Because these structures break the link between control and cash flow rights, the effect of entrenchment as measured by the managers' control rights and the effect of incentive alignment as measured by managers' cash flow rights held in the firm, can each be measured separately. The evidence in this study is consistent with compensation disclosure transparency decreasing in managers' voting control and increasing in their cash flow rights.
It needs to be cautioned that because the empirical analyses are carried out on a limited sample of firms (i.e. those with unequal voting rights), the generalizability of these results to the incentive and entrenchment effects related to corporate ownership structure in general, may be limited. Future research may address this issue more comprehensively by considering larger samples that include other diverse ownership structures that allow for control divergence, such as stock pyramids and cross-ownership structures. The preponderance of such structures in parts of Europe and East Asia present an interesting opportunity to generalize some of the predictions made in this study to these other diverse ownership structures.
identify the peer group, they can choose to be vague in their disclosure on the identity of the peer group. The potential for obscure disclosure is evident in cases where the company uses a self-constructed peer group (as opposed to a market or industry index such as the S&P500 group or companies in the Philadelphia Semiconductor Index) to benchmark its compensation-performance relationship. A score of 1 is awarded if the company clearly identifies the peer group; 0 otherwise. Does the firm disclose the percentile on which base salaries are formulated relative to peers? (PERCENTILE) Companies have discretion to report the percentile ranking at which it benchmarks its executive salaries relative to its peer group. The choice of words such as ''median'' or ''75th percentile'' may be used to describe these benchmarks. A score of 1 is awarded if the company discloses this information; 0 otherwise. Does the firm disclose the range of executive bonuses or options offered to its executives as a percentage of base salaries (BONUS1) or as a percentage of certain targeted amounts (BONUS2)? Companies have the discretion to report how executive bonuses or option grants are calculated, as a percentage of base salaries or as a percentage of certain targeted amounts. A score of 1 is awarded if the company discloses this information; 0 otherwise. Does the firm disclose the percentile ranking at which incentive or performance based compensation is targeted relative to peers? (BONUS3) Companies have discretion to report the percentile ranking at which it benchmarks its incentive compensation relative to its peer group. Companies often disclose this information jointly for salaries and bonuses. In these cases, the disclosure is assumed to occur under the disclosure variable PERCENTILE. A score of 1 is awarded if the company discloses this information; 0 otherwise. Are details of the CEO's contract disclosed separately from other executives in the firm? (CEO_CONTRACT) Companies are required to furnish all the elements of a CEO's compensation and the criteria for its determination. However they have the choice to club these disclosures along with those for other executives of the firm or to report these disclosures separately for the CEO. A score of 1 is awarded if the company separately discloses the details of the CEO contract; 0 otherwise. Does the company disclose the specific performance measures and their computation on which performance related pay is based? (EXEC_SPECIF-ICS) Companies have discretion in disclosing the actual financial or non-financial metrics and their computations that form the basis of performance related pay. A score of 2 is awarded if the firm discloses the metric as well as its actual computation, 1 if the firm discloses the metric but not the computation and 0 if the firm discloses no metrics. Disclosures of certain self-explanatory GAAP based metrics such as ''Net Income'' or ''Net Sales'' or non-financial measures such as ''cell phone subscribers'' are awarded the full 2 points. Does the firm disclose the weight on financial, non-financial and personal performance measures for award of performance based compensation, for one or more of its managers? (WEIGHT) Companies have discretion in disclosing the weights that they place on financial or personal performance for awarding performance-related pay. A score of 1 is awarded if the company discloses this information; a score of 1 is awarded if the company specifically discloses that it does not assign any weight on financial, non-financial and/or personal performance measures for award of performance based compensation; a score of 0 is awarded if company does not disclose weights or does not disclose that it does not use weights for award of performance-based compensation.
Does the firm disclose any specific quantitative targets for award of performance based compensation? (QUANT) Companies usually have certain quantitative targets for award of performance-related pay. However they have discretion in choosing to disclose this information. A score of 1 is awarded if the company discloses this information; 0 otherwise. 
Variables Explanation
Name Insiders are more likely to place a high value on the private benefits of control if the company is named after one of its insiders Media Some industries offer more private benefit opportunities than others. As documented in DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1985) and Smart and Zutter (2003) , media firms are more likely to have dual class status % Firms and % Sales Private benefits of control are larger when insiders have the opportunity to be the major employer in their region: that is, when the firm is the ''only game in town''. In this case, dual class structures are more likely to be observed when there are fewer firms located in the same region. Firms may use dual class status to promise to local authorities that the firm will resist unsolicited takeovers in order to honor implicit contracts with local government and other stakeholders. An alternative possibility is that regions crowded with large firms allow more scope for local M&A activity and dual class status could serve as an antitakeover protection. The net effect of these two forces is captured by %Firms and %Sales
Sales Rank
Private benefits of control are stronger for firms where the founders are still active. One proxy for founder status is the age of the firm. The percentile ranking of the IPO-year sales of the firm relative to other firms with the same IPO year measures the fact that sales at the time of IPO is likely to be positively correlated with firm age which in turn is correlated with founder status
Profit Rank
Private benefits of control are likely to be positively correlated with cash flow and profitability as free cash flows can be diverted towards excess compensation and pet projects. Since investors recognize this relationship, they are likely to demand control discounts that are positively correlated with profitability, thus increasing the private costs of control. The net effect is of these two forces is an empirical question State Anti-takeover Index Dual class equity is a powerful anti-takeover protection. Since this protection may be less valuable for companies incorporated in states with anti-takeover laws, dual class equity is more likely to be observed in states with weak state anti-takeover protection Sales/County Sales An alternative measure of the ''only game in town effect'' is the ratio of firm sales to the sales of all firms in the same region. This measure is a proxy for the firm's ''share of the local pie''
Fama-French Industry Indicator Variables
Since private benefits of control vary with industries, dummy variables for each of the industries as defined by Fama and French (1997) 2710, 2711, 2720, 2721, 2730, 2731, 4830, 4832, 4833, 4840, 4841, 7810, 7812, 7820; State anti-takeover index The index is taken from Gompers et al. (2003) and is measured on a scale of 0-6 for the state in which the firm was incorporated Fama-French industry dummies See Fama and French (1997) 
